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ABSTRACT
Towards Using Certificate-Based Authentication as a Defense Against
Evil Twins in 802.11 Networks
Travis S. Hendershot
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Wireless clients are vulnerable to exploitation by evil twins due to flaws in the authentication process of 802.11 Wi-Fi networks. Current certificate-based wireless authentication
protocols present a potential solution, but are limited in their ability to provide a secure
and usable platform for certificate validation. Our work seeks to mitigate these limitations by exploring a client-side strategy for utilizing alternative trust models in wireless
network authentication. We compile a taxonomy of various trust models for conducting
certificate-based authentication of wireless networks and methodically evaluate each model
according to desirable properties of security, usability, and deployability. We then build a
platform for leveraging alternative certificate-based trust models in wireless networks, present
a proof-of-concept using one of the most promising alternative validation models identified—a
whitelisting and pinning hybrid—and examine its effectiveness at defending against evil twin
attacks in 802.11 networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Today’s widespread deployment of Wi-Fi networks enables users to maintain a nearconstant connection to the Internet. The Wi-Fi Alliance recently reported the remarkable
existence of over 47 million public Wi-Fi hotspots worldwide [25]. In addition, an estimated 800
million households world-wide will maintain Wi-Fi access in 2016 [15]. Users are increasingly
relying on Wi-Fi networks to connect smart homes and mobile devices such as smartphones,
tablets, and laptops. It is therefore essential that the community considers the sensitivity of
the information being wirelessly transmitted over these networks.
Despite considerable attention in the past decade, a majority of networks worldwide
remain open to an attack from an evil twin access point. This attack, which was brought
into public focus due to its popular disclosure by AirDefense at the RSA Conference of 2007
[10], still persists as a fundamental vulnerability in wireless networks.
The most widespread wireless authentication protocol today, WPA2-PSK, is vulnerable
to this attack if a network is configured with an insecure password or the network adopts
the current practice of publishing pre-shared keys for public Wi-Fi use. Networks using the
802.1X authentication protocol can also be vulnerable to an evil twin attack when client
Wi-Fi supplicants are not set up to correctly validate network certificates. Furthermore, any
Wi-Fi access point left in an open configuration can be trivially exploited, as well.
There are two standard approaches to defending against evil twins: detection techniques
and prevention strategies. The vast majority of the literature exploring evil twin defenses is
centered around detection techniques. A variety of methods exist for identifying evil twins,
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but they are limited in their applicability and often cannot detect all variations of an evil
twin. Prevention strategies focus on certificate-based authentication, but rely on the existing
Certificate Authority infrastructure. This places additional costs on networks and inherits
all the flaws of the CA system [1, 5, 19, 22]. In addition, certificate-based authentication
typically validates the name of an associated RADIUS server, not the SSID of the wireless
network, which causes additional complications.
To provide stronger protection against evil twin attacks, we propose the use of enhanced
certificate-based authentication, with alternative trust models that address weaknesses of the
CA model and current practices. We first conduct a comparative analysis of alternative trust
models in the scope of wireless network authentication, showing that these models have the
potential to provide increased security, usability, and deployability benefits that can foster
the growth of certificate-based authentication in wireless networks. We then implement a
platform to provide flexibility for utilizing alternative certificate trust models within wireless
networking clients. This platform leverages the TrustBase middleware [18], a tool used
in ongoing certificate-based research on the Internet that provides pluggable modules for
alternative certificate validation models. We present a proof-of-concept implementation of a
whitelisting and pinning hybrid trust model within this platform, and analyze its benefits of
preventing a variety of evil twin attacks.
In this work, we make the following contributions:
1. We propose the use of enhanced certificate-based authentication with alternative trust
models as a viable strategy for preventing exploitation by evil twins.
2. We present a taxonomy and comparative analysis of public key certificate trust models
for wireless network authentication. We describe the benefits of merging individual
trust models into more comprehensive hybrid models that leverage their individual
strengths to overcome weaknesses.
3. We extend an open source wpa supplicant to use certificate-based authentication with
alternative trust models through an integration of the TrustBase authentication system.
2

Our platform extends the scope of TrustBase to include wireless networks. This result
has the potential to unify certificate-based authentication in the web and wireless
domains.
4. We prototype a hybrid trust model based on our comparative analysis that combines
whitelisting and pinning. We analyze its ability to combat the threat model of an evil
twin. Our implementation demonstrates how researchers can leverage TrustBase to
study certificate-based authentication for wireless networks.
Our results indicate that there are clear and immediate benefits to encouraging the use
of certificate-based validation of wireless networks. However, the current practice of relying on
Certificate Authorities restricts the security, usability, and deployability of using certificates
to authenticate wireless networks. By utilizing trust models that fit the appropriate needs of
varying network environments, such as those found in homes or public locations, certificatebased authentication can adapt to the specific environments where it will be needed. These
alternative trust models present many unique benefits over the current status quo, and
thus assist in overcoming hurdles to mainstream adoption. Furthermore, by identifying a
client-side strategy that enables flexible certificate validation without the need for major
protocol changes across a network, this solution can be rolled out gradually to client devices
without the need to immediately reconfigure every network for compatibility.
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Chapter 2
Related Work

The community has explored many diverse solutions to evil twin attacks, each with
their own advantages and disadvantages. A few basic but popular solutions include enforcing
the HTTPS protocol on all wireless web traffic, incorporating a local firewall and antivirus
software, or using a Virtual Private Network (VPN). These solutions may be effective to
various degrees but are incomplete. For example, using either HTTPS or a VPN does not
secure the use of local network resources, and these solutions place additional cost/delay
on network traffic. Therefore, a number of advanced techniques have been proposed to
compensate for the lack of network authentication by wireless clients.
Techniques developed for detecting the presence of evil twins can be divided into two
broad categories, depending on whether they are implemented on the network side or the
client side. The following two sections take a deeper look into these two categories. We then
examine previous work on certificate-based authentication within wireless networking, and
follow with related work on alternative trust models for validating public key certificates
within TLS on the Internet.

2.1

Network-side Evil Twin Detection

Network-side solutions provide a method for network administrators to monitor their networks
and detect the presence of any unauthorized access points. These solutions can be further
subdivided by whether they are implemented as a wired or wireless solution.
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Wired: One class of techniques for detecting a rogue access point is wired traffic
fingerprinting. This approach first attempts to characterize the typical traffic of a network.
Then, later on, when atypical traffic is discovered, the network can flag the possibility that
a rogue access point has been connected. Methods of fingerprinting include the analysis of
packet interarrival times, TCP ACK arrival times, and packet round-trip times [2].
A second but similar technique is wired device fingerprinting. In this technique,
a machine on the network queries connected devices in order to fingerprint their unique
characteristics [2]. This assumes that each enterprise access point will be a different device
model than the attacker’s evil twin device. When the network queries a connected evil twin
device, the response will show that the evil twin is an outlier and should not be allowed on
the network. This method fails if the attacker either uses a device similar to the others on
the network, or spoofs the use of a similar device by manipulating the query’s response.
Wired approaches often have the disadvantage of being unable to detect the presence
of evil twins who hide behind a legitimate access point (i.e., those that forward network
traffic from their clients to another AP on the network.) Additionally, advanced attackers
can exploit the fact that many wired techniques utilize statistical analyses by countering
with traffic-shaping techniques to blend in their traffic with the rest of the packets on the
network. In these cases, a wireless approach to identifying evil twins may be more effective.
Wireless: The most common wireless technique is wireless passive sniffing. This
consists of deploying sensors throughout the network and discovering both physical- and
link-layer information from devices that are propagating Wi-Fi signals through the air.
Information helpful for discovering an evil twin includes the media-access-control (MAC)
addresses, signal strengths, RF measurements, and access point control messages of nearby
devices [2]. Any anomalies in these measurements can signal that an unexpected wireless
device is being used within the sampled region. This method can be effective at proactively
identifying the presence of rogue access points, but requires additional hardware that can be
very expensive (one Laptop Analyzer by Air Magnet costs around US$3,000) [2]. Thus, this
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solution is not easily scalable. It also fails to detect attackers that utilize directional antennas
or other methods to decrease the ability to sniff their traffic.
Another technique called wireless active fingerprinting relies on actively probing local
Wi-Fi stations and analyzing their responses to a certain set of well-crafted requests. This
technique, proposed by Bratus et al., can discover certain qualifying information about the
hardware, firmware, and device drivers by classifying the results that come back from these
custom requests [3]. This classification can overcome the use of MAC address spoofing in
evil twins and can notify the administrator about new devices that do not match the typical
expectations of routers on the network. However, many attackers are sophisticated and will
not respond to active probing—thus reducing the value of this approach.
All of these network-side approaches fail to identify evil twins that are not co-located
in the vicinity of the actual network.

2.2

Client-side Evil Twin Detection

From the client side, there are also a variety of approaches for detecting the presence of an
evil twin.
Fingerprinting: Some methods attempt to identify a difference in the fingerprint
of the network. A branch of techniques called multi-hop detection attempts to determine
whether an evil twin is introducing an additional “hop” into the wireless network stream.
For instance, Han et al. measure the rount-trip time (RTT) between the client and the local
Domain Name System (DNS) server in order to determine whether the RTT is significantly
longer than normal [9]. These techniques assume that the evil twin is forwarding received
packets on to the legitimate access point. Lanze et al. utilize the dependency of clock skews
on temperature within wireless access points in order to perform remote device fingerprinting
of APs [12]. Clocks within wireless routers vary at small yet observable differences, which
allows the clock to be used as a unique identifier for a device. This strategy is effective
but requires the client to have previously measured the clock skew of the actual device and
6

does not scale to networks that use multiple access points. In a separate paper, Lanze et al.
describe the process of using radiometric signal properties to fingerprint a device [13]. This
technique can be effective but requires dedicated specialized hardware in order to be carried
out. Active fingerprinting may also be accomplished by sending out probe requests, similar
to the probing technique used by a network.
Location Tracking: Context Leashing is a method for detecting evil twins that
involves remembering the context of available Wi-Fi networks found locally to the network
[8]. When a user connects to a wireless network for the first time, their device remembers the
other wireless networks available at that location. Then, when the user attempts to reconnect
to the network, the device verifies that the same local wireless networks are still available.
This strategy only works when the user has previously connected to the network, and it is
unable to identify situations where a legitimate change in available networks has occurred
(such as a neighbor adding or removing a network.) It also only works when the evil twin is
not co-located with the actual network.
Software-based AP: Since one of the easiest ways to set up an evil twin is through
the use of a software-based access point, as opposed to a dedicated router, a variety of
techniques center around detecting anomalies in software-based APs. These techniques
measure either accuracy flaws due to router emulation or abnormalities resulting from the
client’s networking hardware [14]. This relies on the assumption that all evil twins are
software-based, and all software-based APs are evil twins, which may not be universally true.

2.3

Wireless Network Authentication

A few Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) modules have been developed in order to
enable certificate-based authentication in wireless networks. EAP-TLS is an IETF open
standard that uses a TLS handshake to perform mutual authentication [21]. Though not
mandated by the standard, most implementations require that both the supplicant and the
authentication server present certificates during the handshake. EAP-TTLS is another IETF
7

open standard that typically uses a certificate only for server authentication and tunnels
another EAP module for client authentication [7]. Both of these TLS-based EAP modules
require the use of a CA-signed certificate, according to their specifications. EAP-PEAP is
an additional EAP module that has been developed in a joint effort by Microsoft, Cisco
Systems, and RSA Security [26]. It is similar to EAP-TTLS in that it uses a certificate
for server authentication and encapsulates another protocol, EAP-MSCHAPv2, for client
authentication.
Gonzales et al. proposed EAP-SWAT, a new EAP module [8]. This module would
be similar to EAP-TTLS, except that instead of relying on the CA model for validation, it
would require the client to trust the certificate in a “trust-on-first-use” manner. To the best
of our knowledge, no prototypes of this proposal were ever built.
A joint effort by Byrd et al. experimented with providing certificate-based authentication in open wireless networks, referred to as Secure Open Wireless Networking [4]. This
work seeks to enable EAP-TLS without the dual requirement for a client certificate. The
motivation is that by using EAP-TLS for server-side only authentication, networks can
achieve an authentication handshake similar to TLS on the Internet.
Ou presents a stopgap solution using EAP-PEAP with dummy MS-CHAPv2 credentials
in order to provide network authentication and session key establishment on an “open” public
Wi-Fi network [20].

2.4

Certificate Authentication on the Web

X.509 certificates are used when authenticating web servers via the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol over TLS (HTTPS). Much of the literature contends that the Certificate Authority
system used for validating certificates over HTTPS has significant weaknesses.
Clark and van Oorschot claim that there is currently a disintegration of confidence in
the ability of the Certificate Authority system to support the HTTPS certificate infrastructure
[5]. They cite a loosening in issuance requirements, an abundancy of CAs, and examples
8

of CA compromises all as issues leading to elevated concern within the security community
about the efficacy of the CA model to prevent man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks on HTTPS.
They also expand upon the CA trust model by identifying other techniques that could provide
heightened security to HTTPS. A few techniques they identify are key pinning, multipath
probing, and whitelisting.
Bates et al. further examine growing doubt in the ability of the current CA model
to verify web server certificates. They build a client tool called CertShim [1] that enables
alternative trust models for verifying TLS traffic on the web. Oppliger calls for certificate
legitimation via an evolution of the current CA trust model after showing that various attacks
against trusted CAs such as Comodo and DigiNotar have eroded the legitimacy of certificate
validation on the Web [19]. Soghoian and Stamm examine cases where the CA system
has been compromised by nation-states who have compelled trusted CAs to grant invalid
certificates for the purpose of government interception [22]. Wang et al. propose using the
CA model but requiring multiple CA signatures for a certificate [23].
Various implementations of alternative trust models have been explored as candidates
for expanding or replacing the CA system. Certificate Patrol1 is a Firefox plugin that
implements certificate pinning on the web. DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) is a key pinning strategy wherein servers pin their public key in their associated
DNSSEC record [11]. Perspectives is a validation strategy proposed by Wendlandt et al.
that enables the client to utilize multi-path probing by asking several notaries for their
perspective on the proper certificate for a given web domain [24]. Convergence is an extension
of Perspectives, developed by Moxie Marlinspike, that uses multi-path probing but also
allows for flexible decision-making on reaching a final verdict for the certificate validation
[17]. Certificate Transparency is an IETF open standard that utilizes logs, monitors, and
auditors to track valid certificates for servers on the web [16]. The Monkeysphere2 project uses
OpenPGP’s web of trust model to validate server certificates; web of trust is a decentralized
1
2

https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-patrol/
http://web.monkeysphere.info/
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method where users in the community sign the public keys of other users, thus endorsing
that user as the key’s owner. We consider many of these same trust models in the context of
wireless network authentication.
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Chapter 3
Wireless Security Protocols

The most prevalent wireless network security protocol in use today is Wi-Fi Protected
Access 2 (WPA2). This protocol, based on the latest IEEE 802.11i standard, utilizes a
four-way handshake to prove that both the client and the network have mutual knowledge of a
pre-shared key (PSK). If this handshake fails, the connection is terminated. If it is successful,
the client station (supplicant) derives a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) in conjunction with
the access point (AP), or authenticator, of the network. The PTK is then used to provide
confidentiality and integrity throughout the session via the application of one of two protocols:
TKIP1 or CCMP2 .
In some cases, the limited amount of security gained through the use of a universally
shared secret in WPA2-PSK is insufficient. The entire security of this system relies on the
secrecy of the pre-shared key. If the key ends up in the wrong hands, all authentication
and encryption of the network is compromised. For networks that require tighter security
guarantees than are given through the use of WPA2-PSK, an extension to WPA2 has been
developed called 802.1X. The IEEE 802.1X standard provides additional authentication
methods through the encapsulation of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over
LAN, referred to as EAPOL. This extension to the typical four-way handshake is implemented through the use of a separate authentication server on the LAN, called a RADIUS
server. During the initial connection from the supplicant to the network access point, the
authentication request from the client is forwarded to the RADIUS server, which handles
1
2

Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
Counter Mode Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol
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the steps for authentication of both parties as well as the granting of access privileges to the
network. The RADIUS server has a variety of predesignated authentication methods built-in,
and the network administrator is required to configure which method is acceptable for their
network.
In design, the 802.1X standard is meant to provide a reliable means of mutual
authentication of both the supplicant and the network. However, many networks avoid these
additional security features entirely. Even networks that do integrate a RADIUS server often
take shortcuts that result in undermining the overall security benefits that these additions
are meant to provide in the first place. A core issue here is the lack of ease in deployment.
One complication that causes difficulty with 802.1X deployments is the additional
setup required to integrate EAP-based authentication into a network connection’s initial
handshake. In particular, many EAP authentication methods require the use of an X.509
public key certificate that has been signed and authorized by a trusted Certificate Authority
(CA) in order for successful client-side authentication of the network [7, 21, 26].
An X.509 certificate is a common authentication mechanism when two unfamiliar
parties without a shared secret attempt to communicate securely over an insecure channel,
such as on the Internet. The certificate typically contains the name of an issuer, the Common
Name (and possibly other identifying information) of the subject being vetted, and the digital
signature of the issuer verifying that this subject is authorized to act in said name’s behalf.
Obtaining a certificate requires the subject to either purchase it from a universally trusted
CA, or set up their own Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and distribute their PKI root
authority’s signing certificate to all connected client devices.
The CA trust model thus places additional cost on the network administrator and
constrains the clients to reliance on a Certificate Authority as a Trusted Third-Party (TTP),
rather than permitting clients the flexibility to determine their own trust relationships. Later
in this paper, we will more closely examine the costs of utilizing Cerificate Authorities for
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wireless network authentication and also look at the benefits of alternative approaches to
certificate validation.

13

Chapter 4
Evil Twin Threat Model

In order to understand the implications of an evil twin attack and properly design
an effective defense, it is first pertinent to analyze the attacker’s motivations and the
corresponding threat model.

4.1

Context

There are multiple scenarios by which an implementation of an 802.11 Wi-Fi network can lack
proper network authentication. If clients do not securely authenticate their wireless networks,
the door is left open for malicious actors to masquerade as a trusted network. They exploit
the vulnerability by setting up a clone of the network that looks identical to the original AP.
The clone is typically configured with the same name (referred to as the Service Set Identifier,
or SSID) and the same protocol as the actual network, and the client’s wireless supplicant
cannot tell the difference between them.
This type of attack (shown in Figure 4.1) is called an evil twin attack because the
network is set up to look like an exact twin of the original. The attack is a subcategory of an
overarching brand of attacks called rogue access points. In an evil twin attack, the malicious
actor attempts to exploit a client’s trust in a familiar network in order to illicitly gain access
to sensitive information or systems. Wireless clients placed in this situation put unfounded
trust in their wireless network connection. Evil actors then have the means and desire to
exploit this misplaced trust.
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Figure 4.1: Evil Twin Attack
Without a secure method to authenticate wireless networks, clients are left vulnerable
to exploitation by rogue access points. The attack scenario presented here is relevant to all
users of 802.11 Wi-Fi networks who do not properly authenticate their network connections.
Therefore, this is an extreme point of concern as wireless network usage continues to grow.

4.2

Evil Twin Motivations

An evil twin access point injects the attacker into the middle of network communications to
and from a victim. Becoming a man-in-the-middle (MitM) to a victim’s Internet traffic grants
the attacker the potential to hijack the victim’s session, steal their identity, or read and alter
traffic that has not been sufficiently encrypted. Even in cases where end-to-end encryption
is used, if the attacker can convince the victim that a spoofed X.509 certificate is valid for
the endpoint they are trying to connect to, then the attacker can leverage that certificate to
become a MitM within the encrypted communication. Attackers may also exploit the practice
that some wireless networks take of asking the user to install a new trusted root certificate,
and users are not well positioned to evaluate whether to trust the certificate being presented.
Additionally, attackers may search for vulnerabilities on the victim’s device, fingerprint traffic
and open TCP/UDP ports on the device, or impersonate network resources such as DNS,
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SMTP, DHCP, and networked printers. Worst of all, the victims are often left completely
unaware that they have been compromised.
These abilities can lead to an attacker obtaining money, stealing corporate secrets, or
accessing restricted resources.

4.3

Vulnerable Protocols

Clients of open networks, WPA2-PSK networks, and even WPA2-Enterprise networks with
802.1X authentication can be vulnerable to an evil twin attack.
In open networks, the requirements for setup are trivial. The attacker merely needs
to set the Service Set Identifier (SSID) of their evil twin to the name of the network being
cloned. Since no passwords or other means of identification are present, they will appear to
the user as another legitimate AP for the cloned network.
WPA2-PSK networks require a bit more work in order to clone, since the attacker
will need to acquire the pre-shared key. If the key is a secure password and maintained
confidentially, this can be difficult to achieve. However, numerous public locations have
adopted the habit of widely publishing their pre-shared key in order to make their Wi-Fi more
available, and this sharing behavior enables attackers to set up an evil twin with minimal
effort. Alternatively, if the password used is a default or relatively insecure password, then
the attacker may have a chance at guessing the pre-shared key. In either case, once the
pre-shared key has been obtained, the attacker needs only to set the SSID and PSK to match
the legitimate AP.
WPA2-Enterprise’s 802.1X authentication protocol does have the potential to thwart
evil twin attackers, if network authentication is performed correctly. However, insufficient
steps taken during the authentication handshake can still lead to evil twins being able
to masquerade as these networks. For instance, any client supplicant that disregards the
authentication server’s certificate, or merely validates that the provided certificate is signed
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by a trusted CA, without verifying the name of the associated RADIUS server, can be tricked
into trusting an evil twin.
This weakness is compounded by the fact that some operating systems, such as
Android 4.4, do not even present an option for validating the Common Name of the certificate.
Worse yet, some organizations encourage users to ingnore validating certificates because
network administrators have elected not to set up a valid CA-signed certificate for the
network. For example, published guidelines to connect to the Wi-Fi networks of Georgetown
University1 , Cornell University2 , and the University of Cambridge3 all instruct users to leave
the configuration for the root CA Certificate as “Unspecified,” effectively turning off network
authentication. Even though the ability to prevent evil twins exists through the use of 802.1X,
it is hard in practice for users to correctly set up their certificate validation. We thus identify
the need to strengthen the overall usability and deployability of this authentication protocol,
which should be used as a significant tool in preventing evil twins.

4.4

Variants

There are four variations of an evil twin, as proposed by Lanze et al. [13]:
Replacement Evil Twin
A real AP is removed and replaced by an evil twin in the same location as the old one.
Coexistent Evil Twin
Both an evil twin and the real AP exist at the same location at the same time.
Remote Evil Twin
An evil twin is located at a different location than the actual network.
1

https://uis.georgetown.edu/internet/wireless/saxanet/android
http://www.it.cornell.edu/services/wifi/connectandroid.cfm
3
http://www.ucs.cam.ac.uk/mobiledevices/android/eduroam-android
2
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Ad-hoc Evil Twin
An evil twin is created by an attacker on-the-fly in direct response to a network probe
request originating from the victim’s device, irrespective of location.
Each of these four attack scenarios should be considered independently when designing
a defense against evil twins, as they each present distinct differences that may alter the
effectiveness of a defense strategy.

4.5

Defenses

Multiple detection strategies exist that attempt to discover and react to the presence of
evil twins, rather than proactively inhibiting their ability to fool network clients. Other
strategies, aimed towards prevention of attacks, attempt to design a connection handshake
that is resilient to evil twins by including additional steps for authenticating a network’s
access point. Our work takes this latter approach.
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Chapter 5
Certificate-based Wireless Network Authentication

Our solution to the evil twin vulnerability in 802.11 networks is to utilize certificatebased authentication as an effective means of removing the attacker’s ability to spoof a
trusted network.
Public key cryptography is common in many distributed systems that require a secure
method to authenticate remote parties and ensure privacy of sensitive data (e.g., HTTPS, SSH,
S/MIME). These systems rely on the effective distribution of X.509 public key certificates.
Each certificate includes identifying information about the owner, along with their associated
public key that can be used to establish secure communication [6].
Interestingly, there are striking similarities between the paradigm for secure web
browsing over HTTPS (where the use of public key cryptography is commonplace) and that
of Wi-Fi network hopping. The client is attempting to communicate with an endpoint that
must be authenticated. The client has a limited amount of information (i.e., domain name,
SSID) about the endpoint, and this data is not sufficient alone to securely authenticate the
target. In both of these scenarios, public key certificates can be utilized to ensure proper
authentication of the target.
However, despite the ability of the 802.1X protocol to support public key certificates
for wireless network authentication, very few networks utilize this feature in practice. There
are a number of possible factors that have led to this lack of utilization. In this chapter, we
explore these factors and look at possible mitigations through the use of alternative certificate
validation models.
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5.1

Current State and Limitations

As defined in current standards [6], when a network administrator wants to enable certificatebased authentication, the administrator first needs to obtain a public key certificate that has
been signed by a Certificate Authority. This certificate’s Common Name is assigned according
to the domain name of the RADIUS server (not the SSID of the corresponding network.)
Clients then validating this certificate will need to 1) recognize the signing CA as a trusted
party, and 2) either manually set the name of the RADIUS server to be verified against or be
willing to accept any certificate that has been signed by this trusted CA. This process both
burdens the network administrator and makes it difficult for the client to securely validate
the network.
Additionally, there are security concerns regarding the CA system. The system
restricts the ability for clients to build their own trust relationships. Instead, it requires each
device to place complete trust in the predetermined Certificate Authorities. If any single CA
is compromised by attackers, the entire CA system is effectively broken (since a compromised
CA can sign certificates for every domain.) The ownership of CAs is also a controversial
subject—some CAs are owned by nation-states, which effectively provides those states the
ability to MitM wireless network traffic.
The CA system also restricts the ability to use certificate-based authentication in
personal networks, where the use of self-signed certificates would be of great benefit.

5.2

Trust Model Taxonomy

A range of potential trust models could be used for certificate authentication in wireless
networks. We identify these models and assess their strengths and weaknesses with regards
to a set of desirable properties of security, usability, and deployability. We define properties
of security as those that support privacy and authentication, properties of usability as those
that improve the client user experience, and properties of deployability as those that assist in
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the ease of setting up and maintaining a network. Refer to Table 5.1 for definitions on each
term being used.
We use this methodical approach to surveying trust models in order to enable the
discovery of viable alternatives that can improve upon the properties of the current CA
system. We identify the following six trust models for certificate-based authentication in
wireless networks:
CA System A heirarchical structure is used where all valid certificates can be traced
back to a trusted root certificate via a chain of signatures. The trusted roots are pre-populated
on each client device, and every device must be updated whenever a change in root certificates
occurs.
Pinning Certificates for networks are pinned (i.e., remembered), with a mapping
from the network’s SSID. When a network is visited, its certificate will only be accepted if it
matches the previously pinned certificate for that SSID. Certificates can either be pinned via
a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model or via an out-of-band distribution method, such as QR
codes or NFC tags.
Whitelisting A list of certificates for the most widely-used networks is distributed
to the client, with each certificate matching a particular network SSID. Any certificate not
found as whitelisted for a particular SSID in question is rejected.
Ad-hoc Local Query The Ad-hoc Local Query parallels multi-path strategies found
in website certificate validation, such as the usage of notaries in Perspectives [24]: a technique
that samples website certificates from multiple viewpoints in order to overcome local attacks.
This model adapts multi-path probing to wireless networks by having clients first sample
the certificates provided by local Wi-Fi networks and then share these findings with other
co-located clients through an ad-hoc wireless network. Each device would then use these
shared findings to attempt to reach a unanimous consensus on the appropriate certificate
for a given network, with any variation cuing that a discrepancy might have resulted from a
locally-directed evil twin attack.
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Collaborative Reporting A central location (website) is used where reputation of
network certificates can be crowd-sourced. When connecting to a wireless network, a client
queries the site to request the most highly reputed certificate for the SSID of the network in
question. This is based on the Collaborative Reporting model proposed by Gonzales et al.
[8].
Web of Trust Trust relationships are built in a grassroots fashion, similar to PGP.
Rather than using a hierarchical structure based on CAs, a web of trust relies on a distributed
system to spread trust locally among smaller groups. Each human end user determines who
to trust. This method needs users to be able to share their certificate signatures so other
clients can adopt shared certificates into their own store.

5.3

Comparative Analysis

Table 5.2 presents an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each trust model. Each row
corresponds to a model. Each column stands for a measured property of security, usability, or
deployability. For each cell in the table, a ‘
the desired property, a ‘

’ represents that the trust model fully satisfies

’ represents that the trust model conditionally, but not explicitly,

satisfies the property, and an empty space represents that the trust model does not satisfy
the property. The conditional mark is used for trust models that fulfill an associated property
in some cases, but not always. An explanation of each trust model’s analysis follows below.
First, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of each model individually. Then, we
compare differences between the various models.
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Table 5.1: Definition of Properties
Property

Definition

First Time Authentication

Able to authenticate a network on the first connection

Successive Authentication

Able to authenticate a network on successive connections

Updatable Certificate

Supports certificate updates/replacements for a network

Supports Revocation

Allows for certificate revocation

Maintains Privacy

No private history information is shared with a third party

No Trusted Third Party

No third party involved in trust relationships

No Reliance on User Feedback

Does not require other users’ feedback to validate certificates

SSID as identifier

Supports using SSID as the network identifier

No New User Decisions

Does not introduce any new user decisions

No Internet Connection

No internet connection is required at time of validation

No Additional Hardware Dependency

Nothing beyond standard networking hardware is required

No False Negatives

Does not produce false negatives

No Added Network Expense

No additional monetary cost to the network

Self-signed Certificates

Allows for the use of self-signed certificates

Shared Wi-Fi Networks

Applicable for shared networks

Personal Wi-Fi Networks

Applicable for personal (home) networks

Scalable

Is able to scale to all Wi-Fi networks
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Trust Models
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Table 5.2: Trust Model Comparative Analysis

Security

Pinning+CA
Whitelisting+CA
Ad-hoc+CA
Coll. Reporting+CA
Web of Trust+CA
Pinning+Whitelisting
Usability

*

*

= Satisfies, = Satisfies Conditionally
* Requires Real-time Feedback
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Deployability

5.3.1

Individual Evaluation

CA System: Overall, the CA system performs well at providing necessary security guarantees.
However, all CAs become trusted third parties and revocation requires a preloaded Certificate
Revocation List (CRL). Regarding usability, the CA system does not require any additional
hardware and does not produce false negatives, but also does not support the use of SSIDs
as an identifier (although this has been initially explored by Byrd et al. [4]) and places
the burden on the client to choose which root CA to validate against and whether or not
to verify the certificate’s identifier. These negatives add complexity to the client’s ability
to verify a certificate. The CA system also lacks flexibility to support simpler personal
network deployments because it places additional costs on the network and does not support
self-signed certificates.
Pinning: If certificates are distributed through a TOFU model for pinning, the
user has to decide whether to initially trust the network. The corollary to disregarding
first time authentication is that the overall system is highly usable and deployable in every
environment. A decision must therefore be made about whether it is acceptable to forgo initial
authentication on a network to gain these additional benefits. Pinned certificates are also
unable to differentiate between an evil twin’s certificate and a legitimate certificate update,
and thus false negatives are possible on updated certificates or networks with duplicate SSIDs.
On the other hand, if an out-of-band distribution channel is utilized for clients to acquire
network certificates for pinning, then first time authentication is possible, and updates to
certificates can likewise be made through the same channel. Revocation, however, is still
lacking since certificates are pinned directly onto client devices without a third party to
regulate their validity. Positives of the pinning model include no trusted third parties (because
pinning happens locally on the device) and the ability to pin certificates according to an SSID.
The potential for running into multiple networks with the same SSID (which is possible due
to the lack of a global SSID namespace) is lessened due to certificates being pinned locally.
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Pinning also supports self-signed certificates, is scalable, and can be used in all varieties of
networks where the security guarantees are acceptable.
Whitelisting: Whitelisting excels overall on security, usability, and deployability
characteristics. Its biggest weaknesses are a lack of scalability across wireless networks and
the need to ensure the whitelist is updated on each client when a whitelisted certificate
has been updated. Thus, false negatives are possible if a whitelist has not been updated
before validation. Whitelisting is most effective on high-profile, shared networks where
their certificates could be effectively tracked and distributed. It is impractical for personal
networks.
Ad-hoc Local Query: The proposed Ad-hoc Local Query model could be used for
authentication of all networks but requires real-time feedback (or perhaps cached results)
from other clients in order to make an informed decision. Thus, it is unsuitable for personal
networks that lack multiple connected devices. Evil twins may also mimic or block feedback
from other local devices, which could render this technique ineffective. If no consensus is
reached regarding a network’s certificate (or if no other client feedback is available), the user
is then left to decide whether to trust the network certificate. This model will require an
additional network card to gather feedback from others through an ad-hoc network without
requiring the other devices to disconnect from their current network connections.
Collaborative Reporting: Collaborative Reporting has little security guarantees beyond
security by majority rule. Restraints would have to be placed on user reporting to prevent
evil twin attackers from biasing results in their favor. Privacy of network history would not
be maintained because the central server would receive a request for each network a client
visits and could also track users by their certificate reporting. The system is entirely reliant
on user feedback, and it would be hard to allow for certificates updates. Thus, certificate
updates could lead to false negative results. Additionally, an Internet connection would be
required at the time of connection for any authentication attempt (unless the device was
able to anticipate visited networks and cache results.) Thus, the device may require use of a
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cellular network in order to fetch the proper network certificate. Clients would also need to
decide how to handle cases where a network is not found on the site, and it is unclear how to
handle multiple networks with the same SSID.
Web of Trust: The Web of Trust model provides security guarantees by allowing
a client to determine which third party signatures to trust and how to build out its own
trust relationships. But major questions remain open regarding how to create personal trust
relationships and how to distribute signed certificates. If clients decide to trust certificates on
the first time connecting to a network, then no first time authentication occurs. Certificate
updates and duplicate SSIDs could lead to false negatives, unless the user manually updates
their trusted certificate beforehand. Users rely on (and trust) other users in order to build
their web of trust. Certificate updates and revocation would also require feedback from other
users. The reliance on other users causes this model to be hard to scale. This model also
places many decisions directly into the hands of the user (both a potential strength and
weakness).

5.3.2

Comparisons to the CA System

Pinning vs. CA: The Pinning model without initial out-of-band certificate distribution lacks
the authentication on first use that the CA system provides and does not support automatic
revocation and updating, since pinning itself cannot distinguish between a bad certificate and
a legitimate replacement. However, Pinning also does not need to rely on third parties, and
it flourishes in usability and deployability—a few strengths over the CA system. Additionally,
first time authentication for Pinning could be achieved by using out-of-band distribution
techniques. Also, unlike the CA system, certificate pinning can be transparent to the user, and
an SSID can be used as a Wi-Fi network’s identifier. Pinning accepts self-signed certificates,
so it supports both shared and personal networks.
Whitelisting vs. CA: As long as the whitelist is kept up to date, the Whitelisting model
either provides or builds on every guarantee that the CA system offers, with the exception
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that Whitelisting is unable to reasonably scale to all networks. Whitelisting also allows for
self-signed certificates and the ability to use a network’s SSID as its identifier.
Ad-hoc Local Query vs. CA: The Ad-hoc Local Query (ALQ) model supports both
first time and successive authentication, similar to the CA model. However, the ALQ model
requires real-time feedback (or caching) in order to make trust decisions and has the clear
vulnerability that anyone—including an attacker—is able to pose as a “neutral” party in the
ad-hoc network. A reputation system may thus be needed to keep this behavior in check.
This model also requires additions to network hardware and presents a new user decision
when there is not enough of a consensus to trust a network—two requirements that the CA
system does not have.
Collaborative Reporting vs. CA: Collaborative Reporting (CR) is another model that,
while supportive of self-signed certificates, lacks many of the security benefits provided by the
CA system. It also requires Internet access at the time of validation, while the CA system
does not.
Web of Trust vs. CA: The Web of Trust (WoT) is an intriguing alternative as it supports
self-signed certificates and allows each client to build out its own trust relationships and
maintain its own storage of signed certificates. As a result of having to create individualized
trust relationships, however, the WoT requires the client to take responsibility for determining
which networks to trust and requires other users’ feedback in order to work effectively. The
CA system, on the other hand, works autonomously after initial network setup.

5.4

Hybrid Analysis

To both combine strengths and overcome weaknesses of each of these trust models, we also
examine whether any benefits might be gained by merging multiple validation strategies into
a combined hybrid model.
As a general rule, in Table 5.2 the merging of either ‘Satisfies’ or ‘Satisfies Conditionally’
with ‘Does Not Satisfy’ is represented as ‘Satisfies Conditionally.’ Exceptions are made on
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absolute properties, such as when a cost cannot be overcome through merging or when
support of personal networks is maintained through merging of two models.

5.4.1

CA Hybrids

The first four hybrid models shown are extensions to the Certificate Authority model. We
target these combinations in order to determine whether any shortcomings of the CA model
can be overcome by integration with another validation model.
Pinning+CA: Adding Certificate Pinning, which could be used to accept and pin a
network certificate that does not resolve to a trusted root CA, does present the opportunity to
expand to SSID identifiers and self-signed certificates for pinned certificates. Still, CA signed
certificates do not support these features and the negatives of the CA model concerning cost,
usability, and the inclusion of root CAs as trusted third parties remain.
Whitelisting+CA: The combination of Whitelisting with the CA model would allow
self-signed certificates to be used for whitelisted networks, while ultimately enabling scalability
through the use of the CA model for other non-whitelisted networks. However, it is actually
the large distribution of non-whitelisted networks that would benefit most from the reduced
cost of self-signed certificates as well as from the use of SSID as the identifier. Neither of these
properties are provided by the CA system. Thus, this hybrid still fails to achieve desirable
properties of a personal home Wi-Fi network.
ALQ+CA / CR+CA: Ad-hoc Local Query and Collaborative Reporting could each
provide a plausible fall-back option for validating certificates that do not resolve to any root
Certificate Authorities. However, they are both interesting theoretical models that would
ultimately detract from the security performance of the CA model and present many new
negatives of their own (e.g., feedback requirements and loss of privacy).
Web of Trust+CA: Adding a Web of Trust to the CA system would allow users to
create their own trust relationships without completely relying on CAs. However, negatives
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of both models remain, including increased responsibility on end users and the negatives of
utilizing CAs.

5.4.2

Whitelisting and Pinning Hybrid

Within the comparative analysis, two models in particular stood out as having complementary
strengths and weaknesses: Whitelisting and Pinning. Whitelisting excels at authentication of
public networks whose certificates can be effectively tracked and distributed, while Pinning
scales across all networks and is highly flexible. Both measured highly on usability and
deployability. Therefore, we examined what gains could be made through a combination of
these two models.
We found that the hybrid model performs consistently well across every property
considered in the analysis. For important networks that require heightened security on first
time authentication, the whitelist can be employed, which ensures first time authentication
and streamlined updates. For other networks that fall outside of the whitelist, a pinning
approach can be used that allows for self-signed certificates, use of SSID as the identifier,
and scalability across networks. These other networks could allow TOFU or support a more
strategic distribution mechanism, such as the use of QR codes.
A major consideration for this hybrid is how to deliver whitelisted certificates to client
devices. One route for delivery could be through operating system channels. This option
would follow a push-based strategy, where updates to the whitelist would be pushed out to
client devices in the form of an update. This would follow a similar precedent as the current
root CA store, which is populated on modern operating systems. An open question here is
whether this whitelist would be globally or locally based. Is one master whitelist a viable
solution to cover all networks worldwide that should be represented therein, or is there a
better solution by using multiple whitelists that differ based on locale? Another route for
delivery could instead require clients to actively query a trusted store in order to retrieve a
list of network certificates to include in their whitelist. This option would place responsibility
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on the client for retrieval, but would also allow flexibility of which origins the client trusts to
provide the whitelist.
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Chapter 6
Certificate-based Wireless Authentication Platform

We have designed a platform that enables clients to use a variety of trust models to
authenticate wireless networks. As shown in Chapter 5, alternative trust models have the
potential to provide promising security, usability, and deployability benefits that can further
the application of certificate-based authentication in this domain.

6.1

Design

To provide flexibility with different trust models, our system relies on the TrustBase authentication system. TrustBase is a solution developed to intercept and validate server certificates
in Internet TLS traffic [18]. TrustBase fixes broken certificate validation within desktop
and mobile applications and provides a central hub where alternative certificate validation
models can be developed and analyzed. We aimed to build onto TrustBase and leverage
its capabilities in order to enable a pluggable interface for certificate validation in wireless
network clients. Thus, we designed an external API that enables the Wi-Fi supplicant
(as well as any other application) to communicate with TrustBase for certificate validation
queries. See Figure 6.1 for a layout of the TrustBase integration. This unification of wireless
network validation with web TLS validation enables the research community to collaborate
on authentication models to be used in both domains.
We aimed to create a universal architecture that would remain compatible with
current wireless network protocols. Therefore, our work modifies only client-side software,
enabling the possibility for a step-by-step roll-out that leaves current 802.1X EAP-PEAP
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Figure 6.1: TrustBase Integration
network deployments intact and merely requires other networks to upgrade to this previously
standardized module in order to enable our solution.
This design also allows users to make individualized choices about how they want
to validate a network’s certificate. Our modified client permits the user to configure their
own methods for validating certificates that are provided through 802.1X’s EAP-PEAP
authentication module. TrustBase plugins for multiple validation models are available,
including plugins for the CA system, Certificate Pinning, and Whitelisting.

6.2

Implementation

We modified the open source wpa supplicant within the Ubuntu Linux distribution in order
to extend its certificate validation process during the client’s initial 802.1X authentication
handshake. Upon receipt of a network’s certificate, the supplicant queries TrustBase with
a message that includes the SSID and certificate of the network. TrustBase validates the
certificate based on the configured plugin that has been set up for validation and returns a
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yes/no response to the supplicant. The supplicant then accepts or rejects the TLS handshake
with the network, depending on the response it has received.
The wpa supplicant modification turned out to be a significant and non-trivial step
in building this platform. First, we analyzed the open source code to pin-point where the
certificate validation occurs within the TLS handshake. We then carefully designed an
approach to modifying the existing supplicant that would be as non-obtrusive as possible,
while enabling the additional benefits of the TrustBase authentication system. We achieved
this by utilizing the existing code structure provided for the OpenSSL TLS handshake, and
targeting a specific override of the OpenSSL environment’s certificate verification callback
function to implement a call to TrustBase’s validation engine rather than the typical Certificate
Authority root store verification provided by OpenSSL libraries1 .
TrustBase was designed to support interception of public key certificates found within
TLS connections at the Application Layer. This interception happens within the operating
system kernel and is transparent to all related parties. TrustBase’s interception is used as a
means of securing broken certificate validation for all applications running on an operating
system. However, since the wireless network TLS handshake during 802.1X authentication
happens at a lower layer, this communication is not intercepted by TrustBase. Furthermore,
we decided that designing a method to intercept wireless network TLS traffic would be
inappropriate for our purposes, since we desired to provide a solution integrated directly into
the supplicant and did not want to require additional kernel-level access.
Thus, we designed and built an interface that enables both our application as well
as other future applications to interact directly with TrustBase’s validation engine, instead
of needing to rely on its certificate interception. This API was designed to be generalizable
and applicable to any application that might want to leverage the capabilities of TrustBase’s
authentication system directly. The function calls provided by the API allow for the calling
application to supply both a certificate chain and a string (such as an SSID) to validate
1

https://w1.fi/wpa supplicant/devel/tls openssl 8c.html
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the Common Name of the leaf certificate against. The API call then returns a validation
decision based off of the trust model plugins that have been configured within the TrustBase
environment.
From our analysis in Section 5.4.2, we identified the Whitelisting and Pinning hybrid
model as a highly promising solution for authenticating wireless networks. Accordingly,
we built a plugin for TrustBase that implements this hybrid module as a proof-of-concept
implementation. The plugin consists of two steps. First, the whitelist is examined to discover
whether a certificate has been whitelisted for the current network SSID. If one is found, then
the whitelist is enforced: either the incoming certificate matches the whitelisted certificate
and is accepted, or else it does not match and is rejected. Alternatively, if a whitelisted
certificate for the SSID is not found, then in step two the algorithm uses pinning as a fall-back
option. In this second step, the plugin looks for a pinned certificate for the current SSID. If a
pinned certificate is found, and the certificate is not expired, the algorithm will accept or
reject based on whether the pinned certificate matches the certificate passed in. Otherwise,
the certificate in the incoming query will be pinned for that SSID and will be accepted. This
plugin uses TOFU for pinning but could also be extended to support other distribution
mechanisms for pinned certificates.

6.3

Threat Analysis

In this section, we examine the efficacy of our solution at preventing evil twins in wireless
networks. We present an analysis based on the aforementioned evil twin threat model. This
includes an assessment of the risks presented by evil twin attacks and an analysis of the
effectiveness of our solution at preventing an attack in each of the unique scenarios in which
an evil twin can be found.
Evil twins present risks to network clients because an attacker injects themselves as a
man-in-the-middle to each client’s connection. Without the possibility to perform reliable
network authentication, clients are unable to verify whether they are connecting to the proper
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network or to a clone that has malicious intent. This attack enables the MitM to compromise
the privacy, confidentiality, and integrity of data within the connection stream.
As referenced in the threat model (see Section 4.4), there are four unique variations
of an evil twin attack. We first examine the effectiveness of our solution for each variation
under the assumption that a valid certificate has been either whitelisted or pinned for the
network in question. Afterwards, we discuss the counter-case and possible mitigations.
Replacement Evil Twin In the replacement scenario, an evil twin is placed in the
same location as the original network AP, and the original AP is no longer present. Since the
certificate-based validation scheme does not depend on location-based tracking, the location
of the evil twin is inconsequential. Thus, the validation will still be able to detect that there
is a mismatch of certificates in this scenario, even when the location appears to be correct.
Coexistent Evil Twin A coexistent evil twin is co-located with the original AP.
Our solution will also be able to differentiate between the evil twin and the original in this
scenario, based off of certificate matching. The evil twin’s certificate will not match the
public key certificate that has been whitelisted or pinned by the client, while the original
AP’s certificate will match.
Remote Evil Twin A remote evil twin is located at a different location than the
original. Once again, since the certificate validation is location agnostic, this scenario is
effectively identical to that of the Replacement Evil Twin. The validation will detect that
the certificate does not match the original and the TLS handshake will fail.
Ad-hoc Evil Twin An Ad-hoc Evil Twin is one created on the spot in response
to probe messages searching for a network by SSID. In this case, even if the attacker does
clone the original network’s SSID and other identifying information, without the original
public/private key pair the evil twin is unable to completely mimic the actual network. The
validation will detect that the network certificate does not match.
Despite the ability to detect certificate mismatches in each of the above scenarios,
the Whitelisting/Pinning hybrid trust model will fail to detect an evil twin on a first time
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connection to a non-whitelisted network in any of these scenarios if a TOFU approach is
taken. Likewise, if the certificate for a pinned network is changed, the user must be able to
access the updated certificate through an out-of-band distribution, otherwise the user has
no way to distinguish between a legitimate certificate update or an evil twin attack. This is
one shortcoming that has to be considered when utilizing this trust model. As mentioned
previously, a number of strategies could be used to mitigate this drawback, such as an initial
out-of-band distribution of a certificate through QR Codes, NFC tags, or a similar technology.
Nevertheless, the ability to validate networks at scale based on their public key
certificates would be a monumental step forward in the prevention of evil twin attacks. This
protection brings tremendous value in its power to secure sensitive network connections from
evil twin attacks.

6.4

Experimental Verification

In our laboratory environment, we built a custom network to experiment with our wireless
network authentication platform and verify its effectiveness at defending against evil twin attacks in 802.11 networks. This network consisted of a Linksys WRT54Gv5 wireless broadband
router configured to relay authentication requests to a network-internal Windows environment
running FreeRadius Version 1.1.7, an open-source RADIUS implementation. The RADIUS
server used EAP-PEAP certificate-based 802.1X authentication for all incoming connection
requests (including the use of a valid self-signed certificate for network authentication).
We performed multiple simulations on this network to validate that our modified client
supplicant was able to utilize both whitelisting and pinning to authenticate a valid network
certificate. We then replaced the valid certificate with another certificate in order to simulate
an evil twin attack. During these further simulations, we verified that the client was effective
at detecting and preventing a connection to the evil twin access point. These tests modeled
the client’s validation process for each of the four evil twin variations, as previously defined
in the threat model.
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6.5

Additional Notes

Certificate validation in wireless networking currently depends on the ability to resolve a
given certificate to its trusted root authority. This root authority is either a previously
installed Certificate Authority that the user trusts by default or a signing certificate provided
by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) of the enterprise that administers the network. In
either case, the client must rely on the hierarchical chain back to the root certificate as
sufficient reason to trust the network. The client must therefore trust these root authorities
as authoritative sources.
The framework presented in this paper removes the restriction of strict reliance on
the CA trust model. This provides increased trust agility for the client, as clients are given
the option to use alternative validation methods when deciding whether or not to trust a
network.
This framework also opens the door to not just using one alternative trust model
for all wireless network connections on a device, but also to potentially specifying on a
network-by-network basis which validation model to use. For example, it may be applicable
for a client to maintain usage of the hierarchical CA model for enterprise networks where
a PKI root certificate has been configured, but then switch to a pinning strategy for a
home-based network that can be securely pinned on first time use.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

Certificate-based authentication is an effective means of preventing evil twin attacks in
802.11 wireless networks. By applying alternatives to CA-based network certificate validation,
we lower the barrier-to-entry of deploying certificate-based network authentication and
decouple Wi-Fi certificate validation from a reliance on Certificate Authorities. This, in
turn, provides network administrators with an enhanced ability to configure certificate-based
authentication, and users will be better protected from evil twins.
The use of TrustBase as a open platform to perform certificate validation on both the
Web and wireless spaces empowers the community to research additional trust models for
certificate validation. This framework has demonstrated a capability to provide essential
characteristics of secure authentication, while decreasing the overhead required for deployment.
Moreover, a thorough analysis of potential alternative trust models for wireless network
certificate validation has shown that there are various tradeoffs to be considered among the
differing models. We are optimistic that some of these tradeoffs may be offset by further
exploring the use of hybrid models, such as a combination of Whitelisting and Pinning
certificates. Our analysis suggests that the use of alternative trust models has the ability to
raise the overall security, usability, and deployability of certificate-based authentication in
wireless networks.
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